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Voting behavior and  constituent attitudes are central to many models  of trade 
policy  determination.    Examining  the  demographic  and  economic  variables  that  are 
associated with attitudes toward various trade policies can provide some insight into the 
public perception of globalization, and the political response to those perceptions.  Using 
detailed  response  and  demographic  data  from  the  Program  on  International  Policy 
Attitudes survey “Americans on Globalization, Trade, and Farm Subsidies” I assess a 
number of potential determinants of trade policy  attitudes.  Educational attainment is 
most clearly associated with pro-trade attitudes, and party affiliation suggests a certain 
malleability of opinion on trade issues.  In addition, there is substantial variation in the 
determinants of trade policy attitudes across policy variables. 
 
1. Introduction 
  Voting behavior and  constituent attitudes are central to many models  of trade 
policy determination.  For example, voting behavior is crucial in models such as Mayer’s 
(1984)  median  voter  approach,  while  constituent  attitudes  are  implicitly  important  to 
political  support  approaches  such  as  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994).    In  models  of 
political  influence,  in  general,  the  process  through  which  various  factors  influence 
constituents  may  be  just  as  important  as  the  process  through  which  interest  groups 
influence politicians.  There is, therefore, value in understanding how individual opinions 
regarding economic and trade policies are formed.  
  At  the  very  least,  survey  research  provides  a  quantitative  description  of  the 
distribution of opinions on a given issue.  Coupled with economic and demographic data 
at the individual level, survey data can contribute further to the understanding of the deep 
determinants  of  those  opinions.    Such  is  the  case  with  the  Program  on  International   2 
Policy  Attitudes  (PIPA)/Knowledge  Networks  December  2003-January  2004  national 
survey, “Americans on Globalization, Trade, and Farm Subsidies.”
1 
  The dataset produced as a result of the survey has a number of advantages.  First, 
it assesses American attitudes on a number of distinct trade policy issues, ranging from 
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  and  the  upcoming  Free  Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) to steel tariffs and agriculture subsidies for small 
farmers.    This  allows  for  an  unprecedented  comparison  of  the  bases  of  trade  policy 
opinions across policies.  Second, survey respondents were asked a series of questions 
relating  to  their  individual  economic  and  demographic  characteristics,  including 
employment status, income, occupation, and political party affiliation.  This combined 
information  allows  for  a  statistical  examination  of  the  determinants  of  trade  policy 
attitudes, with a dataset that has not been used in any previous study of this kind. 
  There are several major findings of the paper.  First, the determinants of opinions 
on trade policy are far from uniform across policy variables.  In other words, Americans 
do not view trade policy as a monolithic entity, but, for example, may have favorable 
opinions when it comes to farm subsidies, but unfavorable opinions concerning other 
trade interventions.  This sends a very different message than similar studies that use a 
single generic variable in their analysis.  A college education is more likely than anything 
else  to  make  people  favor  more  liberal  trade  policies.    Finally,  political  affiliation  is 
largely unrelated to trade policy preferences, except in cases where prominent partisans, 
in this context Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, make a vocal public appeal 
on an issue, here the “safeguard” steel tariffs of 2002 and NAFTA, respectively.  
                                                 
1 The major findings of the survey and associated questions can be found on PIPA’s website, 
http://www.pipa.org.  Summary statistics for response and demographic variables used in this paper can be 
found in the Appendix.   3 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the main results 
in the relatively young literature, and some related hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
data.  Section 4 details the regression results and attempts at a coherent interpretation.  
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
  There  is  a  growing  but  incomplete  literature  that  utilizes  survey  responses  to 
evaluate possible determinants of trade policy attitudes.
2  Research varies according to 
the dataset used and the types of explanatory variables considered.  Much of the literature 
involves  explicit  or  implicit  tests  of  the  predictions  of  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  model.  
Balistreri (1997) is an example of some early work in this area.  Using the Canada-US 
Free  Trade  Agreement  as  a  natural  experiment, Balistreri  finds  that  factor  ownership 
matters  for  individual  policy  opinions,  using  data  from  the  1988  Canadian  National 
Election Study. 
Recent work by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) uses data from the National Election 
Studies (NES), which includes a single binary response variable:  whether the subject 
does or does not support additional trade barriers.  By including both education level 
(factor endowment) and occupation (industry of employment) as explanatory variables 
they find that the NES data support a Heckscher-Ohlin theory over a specific-factors 
theory of income distribution.
3  An additional finding of Scheve and Slaughter is that 
asset ownership, in this case a home, matters for trade policy preferences:  homeowners 
                                                 
2 The literature is broader than merely trade policy.  For example, Blinder and Krueger (2004) utilize 
survey data to study the determinants of the quality of an individual’s economic knowledge, with special 
emphasis on their sources of information. 
3 See Bhagwati et al. (1998) for a rigorous theoretical look at these two models, and Magee (1980) for a 
comparison of the political incentives inherent in them.   4 
in labor-intensive communities favor protectionism as a means of increasing real estate 
values. 
  Ongoing work by Mayda and Rodrik (2002), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and 
O’Rourke (2003), uses data from the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) 1995 
survey on national identity.  The cross-country dataset contains responses to a question 
on trade policy (Agree or disagree: “[respondent’s country] should limit the import of 
foreign products in order to protect its national economy.”) that the above authors use as 
their dependent variable, as well as a variety of demographic information.  Rodrik and 
Mayda  (2002)  find  that  both  factor  endowments  (measured  by  education  level)  and 
industry  of  employment  are  important  determinants  of  opinions  on  foreign  imports.  
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and O’Rourke (2003) find strong support for a Heckscher-
Ohlin  type  model.
4    Rodrik  and  Mayda  (2002),  O’Rourke  and  Sinnott  (2001),  and 
O’Rourke  (2003)  include  many  non-economic  variables  in  their  regressions,  such  as 
measures of patriotism, chauvinism, and religiosity.  Despite the atheoretic context, the 
authors find that many of them are strongly associated with trade policy preferences. 
  Data  limitations  of  previous  studies  of  individual  trade  policy  attitudes  have 
forced researchers to use a single dependent variable to measure opinions.  The current 
dataset offers the ability to compare how the determinants of trade policy attitudes differ 
across policy variables.  Moreover, the statistical evidence reported here establishes that 
Americans view trade policy as a multifaceted entity, and that different trade policies 
alter  economic  incentives  in  asymmetric  ways.    For  example,  people  working  in 
                                                 
4 O’Rourke (2003) finds that opinions are consistent with an H-O model featuring trade in goods or 
international labor mobility.   5 
manufacturing may be strongly against NAFTA, but indifferent to the more agriculturally 
oriented CAFTA.   
3. Data 
  The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) is a “joint program of the 
Center on Policy Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies” both at 
the  University  of  Maryland  (http://www.pipa.org).    The  survey  in  question,  titled 
“Americans  on  Globalization,  Trade,  and  Farm  Subsidies”  was  conducted  “with  a 
nationwide sample of 1,896 respondents from December 19 to January 5” 2003-2004 
(Kull et al., 2004). 
  The survey is composed of over 100 questions, though many questions were not 
asked of the entire sample, all related to American international economic policy.  I chose 
seven questions to serve as dependent variables.  The questions were related to the (1) 
widely publicized steel tariffs enacted in 2002, (2) free trade in general, (3) NAFTA, (4) 
globalization in general, (5) farm subsidies for small farmers, (6) the Central America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and (7) the FTAA, respectively.  See the Appendix for 
a complete description of the questions and possible responses. 
  Respondents were also asked a series questions regarding their political views and 
economic  status.    The  demographic  variables  include  occupational  category,  political 
party,  age,  dual  income  household,  education,  race/ethnicity,  gender,  household  size, 
household  income,  marital  status,  state  of  residence,  rural/suburban/urban  area,  home 
ownership, and employment status.  The result is a wealth of information, limited only by 
the fact that much of the data are categorical in nature, even for variables that could be 
measured continuously (e.g. income and education).  This will ultimately limit the ability   6 
of the independent variables to account for more than a small proportion of the variation 
in the response variables. 
  I focus on a subset of variables that are likely to have an economic or political 
interpretation.  (1) Political party:  Democrats are (roughly speaking) the party of labor, 
so in a Heckscher-Ohlin context should generally be anti-trade.  Conversely, Republicans 
are thought to be the party of capital, so the same Stolper-Samuelson reasoning should 
make  them  more  in  favor  of  trade  and  globalization.
5    (2)  Education:    I  convert  the 
categorical education variable into a dummy variable equal to one when the respondent is 
a college graduate.  There are two possible interpretations for the education variable. 
Skilled labor is presumably the abundant factor in the U.S., which should benefit from 
trade.  However, even if the H-O model is not a reasonable description of the economy, a 
college  education  may  still  convey  a  greater  understanding  of  the,  often  intangible, 
benefits of free trade.  Walstad (1997) finds that education in economics affects people’s 
opinions on public policy issues, making them more likely to agree with economists.
6  (3) 
Location:    I  convert  the  residence  variable  to  a  binary  variable  equal  to  one  if  the 
respondent lives in a rural area (zero if urban or suburban).  Rural residents may be more 
financially and culturally connected to the agricultural economy, which will give them a 
vested interest in trade policies that affect farming.  (4) Income:  The income response 
variable is categorical (1 = less than $5000, 2 = $5000-$7499, 3 = $7500-$9999, etc.), so 
I convert it to a continuous (though stepwise) variable (1 = $2500, 2 = $6250, 3 = $8750, 
etc.).  Income may be another signal of ownership of the factors favored by free trade, 
                                                 
5 Judkins and Milner (2004) find that this is the case for left-right parties in 25 developed economies, 
including the United States. 
6 There is a surprising consensus among economists in a number of areas, most notably international trade.  
See Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003).   7 
namely human and physical capital.  Thus higher income individuals are expected to be 
more  in  favor  of  trade.    (5)  Manufacturing  employment:    I  convert  the  categorical 
occupation variable to binary variable which is equal to one if the respondent is employed 
in manufacturing (the category also includes construction and maintenance, which has the 
potential to confound interpretation of the results).
7  With limited factor mobility (i.e. the 
specific factors model) trade preferences will be associated with sectors of the economy.  
Given that manufacturing is often the target of foreign competition, people employed in 
that sector should tend to be anti-trade.  (6) Homeownership:  I also convert the home 
status variable, which has three categories (own/rent/don’t pay for housing), to a dummy 
equal to one if the individual owns their own home.  Asset ownership, in the form of a 
home,  may  insulate  individuals  from  some  of  the  uncertainty  associated  with 
globalization, and thus make them more pro-trade.
8 
  I extend the existing dataset with two variables meant to capture local (state level) 
economic  conditions.    (7)  Unemployment:    As  a  measure  of  local  employment 
conditions, I add state level unemployment data for December 2003.  If unemployment is 
perceived to be a result of foreign competition, local unemployment may bias people 
against trade.
9  (8) Export exposure:  To gauge the importance of international trade to 
the local economy, I construct a measure of export exposure, defined as the quantity of 
                                                 
7 The inclusion of construction and maintenance occupations, along with manufacturing, may be less 
confounding if people view trade liberalization as including the liberalization of immigration policies as 
well.  With immigration allowed, liberalization can create competition for labor-intensive nontradeables, 
including construction and maintenance services. 
8 Later, I also test the generality of Scheve and Slaughter’s (2001) result (that homeowners in labor-
intensive counties are more protectionist) by interacting homeownership with trade exposure.  I provide a 
partial confirmation of the result. 
9 Higher unemployment is associated with greater protectionism at the aggregate level in the US.  See 
Magee, Brock, and Young (1989).   8 
state  production  exported  divided  by  gross  state  product.
10    Individuals  living,  and 
working,  in  areas  with  higher  export  exposure  should  be  more  aware  of,  and 
economically connected to, the benefits of freer trade.   
4.  Results 
4.1 Estimation 
  The reported results are from a logistic regression (logit) estimated with Huber-
White quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors, except for the globalization dependent 
variable (measured from zero to ten) which is estimated by linear regression with White’s 
(1980)  heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix.    In  Tables  1  through  7, 
corresponding  to  the  seven  response  variables,  each  coefficient  is  reported  with  its 
standard  error  in  parentheses,  and  with  an  asterisk  denoting  level  of  statistical 
significance (at *.05 or **.01), if any.   
Ten models are estimated for each dependent variable.  Models 1 through 8 are 
bivariate regressions, which include only a single independent variable (and a constant).  
Model 9 includes all eight explanatory variables.  Limited nonresponse in the explanatory 
variables makes Model 9 somewhat less informative than it would be otherwise.  Because 
the nonresponse is inconsistent across variables, including all independent variables in a 
single  regression  reduces  the  total  sample  size  substantially.    For  this  reason,  I  also 
estimate Model 10 with the explanatory variables that were found to be significant in 
Models  1  through  8.    This  should  eliminate  any  spurious  results  from  the  bivariate 
regressions while reducing the problem of nonresponse associated with Model 9.    
                                                 
10 Export data at the state level is available from TradeStats Express, a service of the International Trade 
Administration at http://tse.export.gov.  Gross state product is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Both are annual data from 2003.   9 
Recall that the eight explanatory variables are party affiliation (PARTY=1 for 
Republican, 0 for Democrat), college graduate (EDUC=1 for yes, 0 for no), rural resident 
(RURAL=1  for  yes,  0  for  no),  state  level  of  unemployment  (UNEMST=percentage 
unemployed  in  December  2003),  household  income  (INCOME=estimated  household 
income in hundreds of dollars), employed in manufacturing (MANU=1 if yes, 0 if no), 
home  ownership  (HOME=1  if  yes,  0  if  no),  and  export  exposure  (XEXP=total  state 
exports/gross state product [in 2003]). 
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  1.63** 




Educ    -.532** 




Unemst      -.095 
(0.089)            -.267 
(0.167)   
Income        2.8E-5 
(2.6E-4)          -4.1E-5 
(3.7E-4)   
Manu          0.117 
(0.215)        -.135 
(0.327)   
Home            0.139 
(0.174)      0.081 
(0.288)   
Xexp              2.35 
(3.06)    6.34 
(6.15)   






*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01 
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  0.005 
(0.168)                -.024 
(0.204)   
Educ    -.788** 




Unemst      0.049 
(0.076)            -.092 
(0.150)   
Income        -3.4E-4 
(2.1E-4)          5.4E-5 
(3.3E-4)   
Manu          0.546** 




Home            0.255 
(0.156)      0.419 
(0.288)   
Xexp              1.06 
(2.34)    -.805 
(4.47)   






*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01 
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  0.354* 




Educ    -.421** 




Unemst      -.131 
(0.082)            0.051 
(.158)   
Income        -1.9E-4 
(2.2E-4)          2.7E-5 
(3.2E-4)   
Manu          0.887** 




Home            0.363* 




Xexp              -5.84* 




Rural                0.260 
(0.149) 
-.024 
(0.227)   
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  -.385 
(0.243)                -.338 
(0.282)   
Educ    0.791** 




Unemst      0.187 
(0.106)            -.089 
(0.208)   
Income        3.6-4 
(2.9E-4)          4.2E-4 
(4.3E-4)   
Manu          -.626* 




Home            0.045 
(0.218)      -.004 
(0.367)   
Xexp              10.3** 




Rural                -.249 
(0.203) 
-.156 
(0.310)   
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  -.251 
(0.167)                -.389 
(.203)   
Educ    -.121 
(0.154)              0.139 
(.233)   
Unemst      0.029 
(0.079)            -.051 
(0.137)   
Income        -5.3E-4 
(2.1E-4)          -7.7E-6 
(3.4E-4)   
Manu          0.037 
(0.184)        0.351 
(0.249)   
Home            -.251 
(0.158)      -.292 
(.243)   
Xexp              0.887 
(2.61)    0.978 
(4.37)   
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  0.053 
(0.173)                0.187 
(0.213)   
Educ    -.469** 




Unemst      -.036 
(0.081)            -.213 
(0.159)   
Income        -9.8E-5 
(2.3E-4)          -7.3E-5 
(3.4E-4)   
Manu          0.439* 




Home            0.129 
(0.160)      0.084 
(0.252)   
Xexp              -3.98 
(2.65)    1.92 
(4.75)   
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Party  0.228 
(0.223)                0.386 
(0.271)   
Educ    -.274 
(0.204)              -.586 
(0.337)   
Unemst      -.096 
(0.101)            -.180 
(0.200)   
Income        -3.5E-4 
(2.9E-4)          -6.3E-4 
(4.1E-4)   
Manu          0.360 
(0.241)        -.320 
(0.327)   
Home            0.086 
(0.194)      0.486 
(0.327)   
Xexp              -4.55 
(3.41)    3.61 
(6.16)   
Rural                0.184 
(0.187) 
-.305 
(0.300)   
*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01 
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4.2 Discussion 
  I will begin by discussing the regressions singly, followed by an interpretation of 
the results as a whole.  Attitudes on the “safeguard” steel tariffs of 2002 are significantly 
affected  by  party  affiliation  (Republicans  think  they  were  the  right  thing  to  do)  and 
education (those with college degrees were against the tariffs).  Education is once again a 
determinant  of  opinions  on  free  trade  in  general  (college  graduates  support  it),  as  is 
employment in the manufacturing sector (manufacturing workers are against it).  Views 
on NAFTA are also related to manufacturing employment (manufacturing workers view 
it as a failure) and party affiliation (Democrats are more likely to view it as a success).  
Export exposure and education are significant determinants of views on globalization in 
general, with college graduates viewing globalization as more positive, as well people 
living in states with greater export-orientation.  Rural residence is the only significant 
determinant of opinions on farm subsidies for small farmers; rather intuitively, people 
who live in rural areas are more likely to believe the government should give subsidies to 
farmers working on 500 or fewer acres.  Individuals with a college education tend to be 
supportive of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, while rural residents are not.  
Finally,  opinions  on  the  FTAA  seem  somewhat  random:    none  of  the  explanatory 
variables are significant determinants of support of FTAA negotiations, despite the fact 
that 92 percent of respondents had an opinion.
11   
An  interesting  picture  emerges  from  the  regression  results  when  they  are 
considered  together.    Educational  attainment  is  most  clearly  associated  with  pro-
globalization  attitudes.    Income  is  not.    The  latter  result  is  at  odds  with  Scheve  and 
                                                 
11 Of all the policy variables discussed here, the FTAA is the most recent, and has received the least amount 
of news coverage (as of December 2004).   18 
Slaughter (2001), and Mayda and Rodrik (2002).  If income is not associated with trade 
policy attitudes, but education is, then the effect of education may be based more on 
information (see Coughlin [2002] for a discussion) and less on factor endowments (as 
income should also indicate that the individual is considerably endowed with physical 
and/or human capital).  Blinder and Krueger (2004) conclude that greater education leads 
people to be better informed about economic policy issues, which could certainly explain 
the effect of college education in this case.   
The  partisan  effect  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting.    Party  affiliation  is  not 
significantly  related  to  opinions  on  globalization  or  free  trade  in  general.    However, 
Republicans are much more likely to support the steel tariffs that President George W. 
Bush approved in 2002.  This became a signature issue for Bush (Economist, February 
14, 2002).   Republicans are significantly less likely to be pro-NAFTA, which was a 
signature issue for Bush’s predecessor, President Bill Clinton. Rather than being a pro-
capital party, as predicted, rank-and-file Republicans instead take positions espoused by 
party leaders (or take the opposite positions of opposing party leaders!).  Blinder and 
Krueger (2004) also find that partisan ideology is a major determinant of opinions on 
policy issues.  This suggests that opinions are very malleable when it comes to trade 
policy.  Attempts at trade liberalization (or trade intervention!) may be made feasible 
through vocal party advocacy. 
There are some industry effects as well.  People working in manufacturing are 
anti-NAFTA and anti-trade in general, and individuals living in rural areas are less likely 
to support the CAFTA, perhaps due to a presumed agricultural comparative advantage of 
Central American nations.  These sector effects, coupled with the fact that income is not a   19 
significant determinant of trade policy attitudes, seem to support a specific-factors view 
of the economy.  This is consistent with Magee (1980), but inconsistent with Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001), and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2002), among others. 
In  general,  it  seems  that  vague  questions  about  globalization  or  trade  are  not 
particularly meaningful to people.  Questions about specific policies, on the other hand, 
are very tangible to people who have an economic interest at stake, or a party leader who 
has taken a stand on the issue.  People do not feel the same way about all trade policies, 
and their individual economic characteristics do not influence their opinions in the same 
way for all trade policies. 
4.3 Role of Home Ownership 
  Scheve and Slaughter (2001) put particular emphasis on the role of assets in their 
analysis of trade policy preferences.  They do not test the role of home ownership in 
isolation (and interestingly, in the results reported earlier here, the coefficient on home 
ownership is marginally significant in only one of the regressions), but by interacting it 
with the degree of import competition.  If some of consumers’ wealth is stored in their 
homes, they should be concerned about how trade policy affects the value of real estate in 
their area.  Trade liberalization (barriers) should increase (decrease) the value of housing 
in export-oriented communities and vice versa for import-competing communities. 
  To test this econometrically, I follow Scheve and Slaughter and interact the home 
ownership  dummy  variable  with  the  measure  of  export  exposure.    It  is  a  significant 
determinant of trade policy attitudes for only one of the dependent variables:  free trade 
in general.  The regression is reported below. 
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Home*(1-Xexp)    0.4222* 
(0.194) 
*Signficant at .05, **Signficant at .01 
  The  results  in  Table  8  provide  some  limited  confirmation  of  Scheve  and 
Slaughter’s (2001) result regarding the role of assets.  Individual opinions of free trade 
are significantly affected by their asset ownership and degree of trade exposure in their 
state; homeowners in states with large import-competing industries are against trade, but 
homeowners in export-oriented states are largely for free trade.   
One  important  difference  between  the  current  analysis  and  theirs  regards  the 
coarseness of the geographic variable.  Here the level of aggregation is the state, whereas 
it is the county in Scheve and Slaughter.  In other words, because of the possibility of 
aggregation bias, one should not read too much into the failure to confirm their results 
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5.  Conclusion 
As with Scheve and Slaughter (2001), the intention here is not to perform an 
explicit test of competing models of comparative advantage,
12 but rather to characterize 
the data in a way that can inform future models of the political economy of trade policy, 
which depend crucially on individual attitudes and voting behavior. In particular, current 
models of political economy may put too much emphasis on the ability of voters to sway 
politicians, and not enough on the ability of elected officials to sway their constituents.  
Research in this area is still developing, and this paper contributes to the growing 
literature  by  revealing  a  few  empirical  generalizations  regarding  the  determinants  of 
attitudes toward globalization. To do this, I mobilize a fresh dataset of opinions on trade 
policies and the demographic backgrounds of individual respondents, and investigate the 
determinants  of  trade  policy  attitudes  econometrically.    First  and  foremost,  the  deep 
determinants of trade policy attitudes are not uniform across policy variables.  Second, 
industry ties (e.g. rural and manufacturing) are important causal factors.  Third, education 
affects trade policy attitudes, though this may be a result of information quality as much 
as factor endowments.  Finally, people seem to develop their trade policy opinions based 
on political affiliation, rather than the other way around.  In other words, trade policy 
attitudes seem to be formed through an eclectic mix of self-interest, informed speculation, 




                                                 
12 As Balistreri (1997) notes, empirical exercises of this type actually are tests of competing theories of 
comparative advantage only under the “assumption that agents are fully informed about the true 
distributional effects of policy,” and these distributional effects are the agents’ overriding concern.   22 
Appendix 
Dependent variable #4 (Q1 in survey): Globalization (percentage of responses) 
 
“I’d like to know how positive or negative you think this process of globalization is, 
overall.  Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being completely negative, 10 













  No answer (3) 
 
Dependent variable #6 (Q33 in survey): CAFTA (percentage of responses) 
 
“As you may know, the US and some countries of Central America have negotiated a 
treaty called the Cental American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that is similar to what 
the US now has with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA.  Would you favor or oppose 
Congress approving such an agreement?” 
   
  Favor (49) 
  Oppose (42) 
  No Answer (10) 
 
Dependent variable #2 (Q35 in survey): Free trade (percentage responses) 
 
“As you may know, there are views on the question of whether the US should promote 
freer trade.  There are also different views on whether the US government should have 
programs that try to help workers who lose their jobs because of free trade.  Which of the 
following three positions comes closest to your point of view?” 
 
I favor free trade, and I believe that it IS necessary for the government to have 
programs to help [workers] who lose their jobs. (60) 
I favor free trade, and I believe that it is NOT necessary for the government to 
have programs to help workers who lose their jobs. (13) 
I do not favor free trade. (22) 
  No answer (5) 
   23 
Dependent variable #5 (Q38 in survey): Farm subsidies (percentage responses) 
 
“Do you favor or oppose the US government giving subsidies to small farmers, who work 
farms less than 500 acres?” 
 
  Favor (77) 
  Oppose (19) 
  No answer (4) 
 
Dependent variable #3 (Q36 in survey): NAFTA (percentage responses) 
 
“As you may know, the US and most countries of North, Central, and South America 
have been discussing the possibility of having a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
similar to what the US now has with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA.  Would you favor 
or oppose have such a new agreement?” 
 
  Favor (52) 
  Oppose (40) 
  No answer (8) 
 
Dependent variable #1 (Q66 in survey): Steel tariffs (percentage responses) 
 
“As you may know, in early 2002 President Bush raised tariffs on steel imports. In 
response to challenges by other countries the World Trade Organization ruled that these 
increases were in violation of international trade rules.  President Bush subsequently 
lowered the steel tariffs.  What is your position on this decision?” 
 
He was right to raise them in the first place, and he was right to lower them in 
response to the WTO ruling. (30) 
It was a mistake for him to raise them in the first place. (32) 
He was right to raise them in the first place and he should not have lowered them 
(24) 
No answer (14) 
 
Dependent variable #3 (Q67 in survey): NAFTA (percentage responses) 
 
 “Do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, has been good or 
bad for the United States?” 
 
  Good (47) 
  Bad (39) 
  Neither (6) 
  No answer (7) 
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Summary statistics for explanatory variables 
 
 
Table 9 – Summary Statistics/Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
Party  0.5028 
(0.5002) 
Educ  0.2642 
(0.4410) 
Unemst  5.8 
(.8885) 
Income  483.5 
(317.6) 
Manu  0.2402 
(0.4274) 
Home  0.7036 
(0.4568) 
Xexp  0.0660 
(0.0274) 
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